



Security Council

Distr.: General
7 January 2003

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

1. Pursuant to paragraph 4 (b) of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 October 1998 (S/1998/1016) and after consultations among the members of the Council, the chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of the following sanctions committees were elected for a period ending 31 December 2003:

**Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 661 (1990)
concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait:**

Chairman: Gunter Pleuger (Germany)

Vice-Chairmen: Bulgaria and Pakistan

**Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 748 (1992)
concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya:**

Chairman: Mamady Traoré (Guinea)

Vice-Chairmen: Bulgaria and Germany

**Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)
concerning Somalia:**

Chairman: Stefan Tafrov (Bulgaria)

Vice-Chairmen: Mexico and Germany

**Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994)
concerning Rwanda**


Chairman: Mikhail Wehbe (Syrian Arab Republic)

Vice-Chairmen: Guinea and Spain

**Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001)
concerning Liberia:**

Chairman: Munir Akram (Pakistan)

Vice-Chairmen: Angola and Syrian Arab Republic



**Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997)
concerning Sierra Leone**

Chairman: Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (Mexico)

Vice-Chairmen: Cameroon and Pakistan

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999)

Chairman: Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile)

Vice-Chairmen: Guinea and Spain

2. The Bureau of each of the above-mentioned sanctions committees will be composed as above for a term ending on 31 December 2003.



Security Council

Distr.: General
7 January 2003

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Note by the President of the Security Council

After consultations among the members of the Security Council, it has been agreed that Ismael Abraão Gaspar Martins, Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations, will serve as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 1 March 2002 (S/2002/207), for a period ending 1 March 2003.





Security Council

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7 January 2003

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Note by the President of the Security Council

After consultations among the members of the Security Council, it has been agreed that Cristián Maquieira, Deputy Representative of Chile to the United Nations, will serve as Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, established pursuant to the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 4270th meeting of the Council, held on 31 January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/3), for a period ending 31 December 2003.





Security Council

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8 January 2003
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**Identical letters dated 3 January 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the
Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities of the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 3 January 2003.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed **Salman**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the identical letters dated 3 January 2003 from the
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the
President of the Security Council**

**Report on the activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection
teams in Iraq**

Inspection activities on Friday, 3 January 2003

I. UNMOVIC biological inspection team

The inspection team, composed of 13 inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.45 a.m. and headed for the Governorate of Basrah. At 2.55 p.m., the inspectors arrived at their hotel in the town of Basrah, where they will spend the night before beginning their inspections in the Governorate tomorrow.

II. UNMOVIC chemical inspection team

The inspection team, comprising six inspectors, left the Canal Hotel at 8.55 a.m. and, at 9.20 a.m., arrived at the Nahrawan site, which belongs to the Bassel State Enterprise, a subsidiary of the Military Industrialization Corporation. This site, which is in the Nahrawan region 40 kilometres east of Baghdad, had been visited by an UNMOVIC inspection team on 22 December 2002. The team inspected the production rooms which were open, then examined the administration building from the outside, which was closed because it was officially a holiday. The team completed its work at 10.45 a.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 11.05 a.m.

III. UNMOVIC missile inspection team

The inspection team, comprising 25 inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. At 9.30 a.m., it arrived at the site of the Maamoun Factory, belonging to the Rasheed State Enterprise, a subsidiary of the Military Industrialization Corporation. This site had been visited by an UNMOVIC inspection team on 31 December 2002. In the factory, the team split into six groups, which inspected all factory facilities without exception. The team also inspected the equipment and machines in the factory and tagged two mixers and 21 receptacles used to mix composite fuel. The team completed its work at 2.10 p.m., then returned to the Canal Hotel at 3 p.m.

IV. Joint UNMOVIC (biological, chemical and missile) inspection team

The inspection team, comprising 13 inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 6.30 a.m. At 9.45 a.m., it arrived in the Muhammadiyat area, 170 kilometres west of Baghdad. The team split into two groups, which toured the area on foot. It took samples of metal and glass, as this desert area had been utilized to conduct missile tests prior to 1991. The team completed its work at 1 p.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 3.45 p.m.

V. Remarks

The UNMOVIC inspection teams visited three sites today. Forty-four inspectors participated in these activities. As Friday is officially a holiday, the inspectors could not meet with those in charge of these sites. They were content to enter those buildings that were open and examine the other buildings from the outside.



Security Council


Distr.: General
8 January 2003
English
Original: Arabic

**Identical letters dated 7 January 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the
Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 5 January 2003 from Mr. Naji Sabri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, concerning the escalation by the United States of its alarming acts of aggression and provocation directed against Iraq and the United Nations peacekeeping force in the boundary zone between Iraq and Kuwait.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed **Salman**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the identical letters dated 7 January 2003 from the
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and
to the President of the Security Council**

The United States has escalated its alarming acts of aggression and provocation directed against Iraq and the United Nations peacekeeping force in the boundary zone between Iraq and Kuwait. Thus at 1230 hours on 5 January 2003 a group of some 60 American heavy tanks and a number of other miscellaneous military vehicles began a military exercise near the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait that is controlled by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). The exercise was conducted in open combat formation and with the use of live ammunition, and the forces in question entered the demilitarized zone. They withdrew at 1630 hours on the same day.

This action represents a dangerous escalation by the United States of the situation in the boundary zone between Iraq and Kuwait. It is a direct threat to regional and international peace and security and shows contempt for international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the Security Council resolutions urging States to respect Iraq's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. These same resolutions also require respect for the demilitarized zone and for the security and safety of UNIKOM personnel. This action comes on top of the other acts of aggression and terrorism being committed by the United States, which include its daily air raids, carried out with the participation of the United Kingdom, on Iraqi towns and villages in the two no-flight zones imposed in violation of international law and the resolutions of the Security Council, its provision of shelter, financing and weapons to groups of mercenaries and traitors so that they may commit terrorist acts inside Iraq, and its cheap leaflet-dropping campaign over Iraqi towns and villages for the purpose of intimidating Iraqi citizens.

We call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Security Council to send a fact-finding mission to document United States violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the Security Council resolutions relating to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, to visit the demilitarized zone and to consider the adoption of appropriate measures to enforce respect for the relevant Security Council resolutions, including their stipulations concerning the tasks of the United Nations peacekeeping force. We further call upon the States Members of the United Nations, and upon the members of the Security Council in particular, to halt this violation of the rule of law in international relations and to declare their complete rejection and unequivocal condemnation of the aggressive designs of the United States with respect to Iraq, given that they are in violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant Security Council resolutions.

(Signed) Naji Sabri
Minister for Foreign Affairs



Security Council

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8 January 2003

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**Letter dated 26 December 2002 from the Chairman of the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the
President of the Security Council**

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has received the attached report from the Central African Republic submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**
Chairman
Counter-Terrorism Committee



Annex

[Original: French]

Letter dated 19 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Central African Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

I have the honour to transmit herewith to the Counter-Terrorism Committee the report of the Central African Republic on preventive measures for combating terrorism, which was drawn up in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) (see enclosure).

(Signed) Fernand **Poukré-Kono**

Enclosure

[Original: French]

Report on preventive measures for combating terrorism in the Central African Republic

The phenomenon of terrorism, which has gained ground in a large part of the world, has attracted the attention of the Central African authorities for a number of years, particularly since 1986, when a terrorist of Lebanese nationality carried out an attack on board a regular flight to Chad after having passed through our country, the Central African Republic.

Since that time, heightened surveillance measures have been taken both on the borders and within the national territory.

In this connection, in order to prevent this phenomenon, Act No. 01.0011 on the adoption of the harmonized law on drug control, extradition and mutual judicial assistance in the field of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, promulgated in 2001, provided, in articles 135, 136, 137 and 138, for a number of measures to facilitate the detection of money-laundering and punish the perpetrators.

After the attack of 11 September 2001 and in accordance with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), these preventive measures for combating terrorism were strengthened as never before.

Accordingly, a planned so-called peaceful march in support of the terrorist Osama bin Laden, scheduled for October 2001 by the Central African Islamic community, was nipped in the bud thanks to the vigilance of the police services and the organizers of this planned demonstration are being kept under surveillance by those services after having been given a stern warning.

During 2002, three Lebanese persons residing in Bangui were suspected of belonging to Osama bin Laden's terrorist network and were the subject of tight checks by the police services with Interpol.

These persons are:

- Bilal Aref, born around 1964 in Adhit, Lebanon, to El Sariba Aref and Subrieh, of Lebanese nationality, a shopkeeper by occupation;
- Safi Aref Saleh, born around 1973 in Beirut, Lebanon, to Saleh Aref and Sophie, of Lebanese nationality, a shopkeeper by occupation;
- Bilal Aref, born around 1967 in Adonit, Lebanon, to Aref Saleh and Sogni Al Sayed, of Lebanese nationality, a shopkeeper by occupation.

Another Lebanese, Ali-Abdulikarim, born on 15 May 1980 in Bentsbeil, Lebanon, and in charge of supplies at SEFCA (Société Forestière en Centrafrique), suspected of having demonstrated a questionable attitude in front of the United States Embassy on 5 April 2002 while travelling in a Mitsubishi pick-up truck, licence No. 21645 BG, was brought in for questioning and interrogated before being released.

Although the aforementioned checks proved fruitless, the activities of these four individuals are nevertheless the subject of heightened, ongoing monitoring by the police services.

The Central African Republic is prepared to cooperate closely with the international community in the relentless struggle against the scourge of terrorism, which spares no country in the world, be it a small one or a great Power.

(Signed) Joseph **Monzoule**



Security Council

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Letter dated 30 December 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I write with reference to my letter of 3 September 2002 (S/2002/994).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has received the attached supplementary report from Jordan, submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could arrange for this letter and its attachment to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**
Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism



Annex

Letter dated 11 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

With regard to your letter dated 27 August 2002, I have the honour to forward Jordan's supplementary report pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) (see enclosure). I hope that the report will respond to the Committee's comments and questions.

(Signed) Zeid Ra'ad Zeid **Al-Hussein**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic]

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan reaffirms the contents of its report (S/2002/127) dated 28 January 2002 and submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and stresses its wholehearted desire to cooperate with the Committee in a way that promotes the combating of international terrorism in the framework of the multilateral endeavour currently under way and in implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan received with great interest the Counter-Terrorism Committee's questions concerning the national efforts which the Kingdom has made, and is making, in this field, as set forth in the Committee's letter No. S/OC.40/2002/MS/OC.138 dated 27 August 2002, in which it requests further clarifications on some points contained in the report submitted by Jordan to the Committee (S/2002/127).

On the basis of the foregoing, the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan places before the Counter-Terrorism Committee the replies to the Committee's questions about the contents of Jordan's report on current and past measures for the combating of terrorism and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).

• **Paragraph 1 (a) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

With regard to the Directives issued by the Jordanian Central Bank (No. 10/2001), referred to in paragraph 2.1 (c) of Jordan's report to the Committee, and the Committee's questions as to whether those Directives on money-laundering specifically address the issue of the financing of terrorism, it should be mentioned that these Directives and the annexed manual of instructions, issued pursuant to the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank under the Banking Code in force, do not deal exhaustively with the subject of the financing of terrorism by means of money-laundering but rather deal with the combating of banking transactions relating to money-laundering generally.

In order to increase legal safeguards with regard to the combating of money-laundering, the Jordanian Central Bank has hastened to submit a draft act to combat money-laundering transactions to the Council of Ministers. Its provisions will cover funds emanating from terrorist activities or funds that may be used to finance terrorism. Article 3 of the draft provides as follows:

"Article 3. For the purposes of this Act, 'illegal funds' shall mean funds directly or indirectly emanating from or relating to any of the following offences:

- (a) Terrorism and kidnapping;
- (b) Illicit traffic in arms and ammunition;
- (c) Traffic in narcotic drugs;

(d) Offences committed in contravention of the provisions of the Economic Offences Code (No. 11 of 1993) or any law amending or replacing it;

(e) Any other offences covered by specific laws or international agreements to which the Kingdom is a party insofar as they involve the offence of money-laundering."

Consequently, the draft act deals with the close relationship between terrorism and money-laundering and also the organic link between money-laundering and traffic in narcotic drugs. It also criminalizes the acts provided for by the international agreements to which Jordan is a party.

With regard to the Committee's questions regarding suspicions of money-laundering transactions entertained by natural or legal persons, banks, money-changing firms and establishments connected with banking transactions, the Directives to combat money-laundering transactions (No. 10 of 2001), referred to in Jordan's report, dealt with this issue and more. Article 93 of the Jordanian Banking Code makes it incumbent on banks and money-changing firms to inform the Central Bank of any suspicion regarding banking transactions that may possibly be related to a number of offences, including terrorism. With a view to expanding the legal bases for control of banking transactions, the above-mentioned draft act to combat money-laundering transactions provides as follows:

"If any legal person commits a money-laundering offence in contravention of the provisions of this Act (the Act to Combat Money-laundering Transactions) and it is proven that the offence was committed with the endorsement or connivance of any manager or employee representing such person, the manager, employee or legal person shall all be regarded as having committed the offence and shall be liable to the penalty laid down in article 12 (a) of this Act."

The penalties laid down under article 12 of the draft act are confiscation of illegal funds and imprisonment of the perpetrator for a term not exceeding three years or a fine not exceeding 1 million dinars or both these penalties combined.

It should be noted that the criminalization covers cases of connivance and criminal complicity. With regard to negligence, the general principles are those applicable to the question of a bank officer's negligence in the performance of his responsibilities. Where gross negligence is involved and its effects are difficult to rectify, the officer is called to account legally to the extent of his responsibilities. In all cases, the authorities concerned with the licensing or control of financial companies must refer all cases or banking transactions where money-laundering is suspected to the Attorney-General, in implementation of the provisions of article 5 (b) of the draft act to combat money-laundering transactions.

It is hoped that this draft act will be approved by the Council of Ministers, that the constitutional procedures for its promulgation will then be completed and that it will enter into effect in immediate future, subject to its approval by the Parliament.

With regard to the Committee's question concerning legal texts dealing with informal banking transactions, e.g., *hawalah*, under the banking and financial system and the provisions of the Banking Code in force, no financial transfers may

be made except through the banks and licensed money-changing firms coming under the control of the Jordanian Central Bank.

• **Paragraph 1 (b) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

With regard to the Committee's question regarding Jordan's intention to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the Jordanian Government has set up a specialized committee, composed of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and the Central Bank, to study all aspects of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, with a view to Jordan's becoming a party to it and to review Jordanian legislation in this context in order to ensure that it is consistent with the provisions of the Convention.

The committee came up with positive conclusions and recommendations in favour of accession to the Convention, which were referred to the Council of Ministers, which adopted the appropriate decision for their approval. The Council of Ministers is expected to approve the Convention in the near future, in preparation for completion of the constitutional procedures and the Convention's entry into effect.

With regard to amendment of article 147, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, there is currently no intention to amend it, owing to the fact that this paragraph already criminalizes the terrorist acts specified in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and imposes a deterrent penalty in respect of such crimes commensurable with such transactions.

• **Paragraph 1 (c) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

The reply to the Committee's question on this paragraph is in two parts:

(a) In cases where the Central Bank exercises its powers to freeze funds that are the object of criminal action according to a decision issued by the Attorney-General or the judiciary (competent court) or in the light of lists of persons involved in, or suspected of committing, criminal acts, the freezing of funds applies to the funds and assets that are the object of the offence;

(b) With regard to economic resources and assets other than bank deposits, the Attorney-General has powers to impound all movable or immovable assets. On the basis of these powers, all public or private State enterprises are prohibited from disposing from such funds, resources and assets by way of sale, donation, assignment or any other form of disposal until such time as a judicial decision is handed down regarding them in accordance with the law.

With regard to persons connected with money-laundering activities, their assets are frozen, an order is issued to halt the execution of banking transactions relating to them, and they are referred to the competent public prosecutor.

• **Paragraph 1 (d) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

With regard to the Committee's question on paragraph 1 (d), the banking system does not have any regime for tracking the use of funds on a regulatory basis after their acquisition by persons. This question comes under the control of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the use of funds for criminal or terrorist purposes is

punishable. It is considered among the material acts pertaining to the punishable crime of terrorism, and such funds are impounded, powers of coordination and cooperation with national and international authorities being accorded in such cases (article 147, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code in force).

• **Paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

With regard to the question whether the recruitment of members of terrorist groups falls under the provision of article 141 of the Penal Code, the answer is in the affirmative. Any recruitment activities are deemed an offence punishable under article 141 of the Penal Code, which provides as follows:

“Any person who, without the consent of the authorities, proceeds to assemble armed factions, enrol or recruit troops or equip or supply them with weapons and ammunition shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than five years.”

With regard to the activities and aims of societies, associations and civil society institutions, the Societies and Associations Act governs the way in which they are monitored. This Act stipulates that the statutes of any association must set forth in detail its main aims and the way in which they are to be attained, as well as details of oversight of its financial affairs and the manner of disposal of its funds, assets and income (article 6 of the Law).

Article 14 of the Act also gives the competent minister the power to examine periodically the financial records of licensed societies and associations and the power to dissolve any society, association or union that denies the examiners permission to check its financial records or in the event of financial activity at variance with the purposes for which it was founded, as set forth in its statutes and the licence issued to it. Again, under article 7 of the Companies Act in force, the Minister of Industry and Trade has the right to monitor non-profit companies insofar as their aims, the sources of their financing and their expenditures are concerned. The collection of funds by terrorist organizations and other illegal organizations is punishable under the above-mentioned article 162 of the Penal Code.

• **Paragraph 2 (c) and (d) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

The Committee requested elaboration on the “stringent security measures” taken in order to implement paragraph 2 (c) and (d). It should be mentioned that the Jordanian security authorities have raised the level of preventive security measures for the strengthening of border control so as to prevent the entry or infiltration of any persons suspected of financing, supporting or carrying out terrorist activities, with a view to protecting national security, implementing the two above-mentioned subparagraphs and preventing the use of Jordanian territory as areas of transit or sojourn for them. As an example of these measures, on the basis of the intelligence data available to the security organs and the lists issued by the Counter-Terrorism Committee regarding the involvement of certain natural and legal persons in terrorist activities, the names in question have been transmitted to the Kingdom’s border posts in order to ensure that such persons are denied entry, and these lists have been circulated to relevant financial and real estate agencies and firms in order to halt any financial dealings suspected of having a connection with such persons. Furthermore, any person or institution suspected of being connected with illegal activities is monitored.

On the basis of Jordan's belief that international terrorism is a threat to collective security and is not confined to any specific State or region, the above-mentioned measures and laws extend to all terrorist persons and groups, even if their activity does not affect Jordanian interests. The rule of law extends to them so long as they are in Jordanian territory or carry out any material or instigatory act therein. This rests on the jurisdiction of Jordanian law, which extends to all persons who engage in terrorist activities and makes them liable to the penalties laid down by that law, as well as on the regional conventions and bilateral agreements that prohibit such activities and by which Jordan is bound.

With regard to the Committee's question about the mechanism for inter-agency cooperation among national authorities for purposes of counter-terrorism and whether a counter-terrorism body exists, and its request to specify the States included in the category of "friendly countries" as referred to in Jordan's report and within the meaning of paragraph 2 (b) and (f) of resolution 1373 (2001), the security organs in Jordan undertake the task of countering terrorism, inasmuch as it constitutes a threat to the security and safety of society. Under the General Intelligence Department Act in force, the Department undertakes the direction and coordination of all counter-terrorism operations and the monitoring of threats to national security, including the threat posed by terrorist organizations. It goes without saying that the security authorities in Jordan have worked for decades to combat and track terrorist threats that have, in the past, affected numerous Jordanian citizens, including officials and diplomats.

In addition to the General Intelligence Department, with its memorable record in the field of counter-terrorism, the public security apparatus, the police, assumes responsibility for maintaining internal security under the Public Security Act in force and ensures control of the border and the prevention and combating of traffic in narcotic drugs. There is a special department within the public security apparatus that is responsible for combating narcotic drugs, namely the department to combat narcotic drugs, forgery and the smuggling of antiquities.

With regard to communications and institutional organization, the current system for the organization and interconnection of the various government agencies ensures smooth operation and coordination, in particular with regard to the security organs attached to the Prime Minister in his capacity as Minister of Defence. With a view to strengthening the Government's commitment to raising the level of coordination between government agencies in the field of counter-terrorism, the Prime Minister issued a decision on 19 September 2002 establishing a committee to follow up requests emanating from the Counter-Terrorism Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). This Committee includes in its membership all competent officials from the various security agencies and relevant government institutions. There is also a higher security committee whose membership includes all the agencies and institutions responsible for protecting national security from terrorist threats, and the Director of General Intelligence holds the position of rapporteur of this committee. There are also smaller-scale security committees representing the various security agencies at the expert level. These are located at border posts and are responsible for monitoring migration, borders and alien entry procedures.

The monitoring of the border in order to prevent the transboundary movement or infiltration of terrorists or their use of Jordanian territory is accorded the utmost

importance by the public security apparatus, as was mentioned in paragraph 2.3 (c) of Jordan's report to the Committee. A specialized bureau within the public security forces, known as the "Border and Alien Affairs Bureau", ensures the protection of the Kingdom's maritime and land borders by means of border posts and mobile patrols and air control of the borders by means of helicopters.

With regard to the security cooperation with "friendly countries" referred to in paragraph 3.2 (d) of Jordan's report to the Committee (p. 8), "friendly countries" means peace-loving States committed to the implementation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations and capable of fulfilling the commitments laid down in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. On the basis of Jordan's commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, particularly those relating to cooperation, there has been intelligence-sharing between Jordanian security agencies and their counterparts in other countries by way of agreement and reciprocal assistance. There are no exhaustive lists of friendly States or specific countries to which security cooperation is limited.

• **Paragraph 2 (e) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

In reply to the Committee's question as to how the Jordanian courts interpret the terms "terrorist activity", "terrorist acts" and "terrorist purposes" as used in the Penal Code, since the amendment of the Jordanian Penal Code on 8 October 2001 to cover terrorist acts as punishable before the State Security Tribunal no sentences have been handed down by this Tribunal concerning the application of the amended provisions containing these terms, because there are no terrorist cases before it at the current time. It is thus not possible to know how the competent court will interpret the above-mentioned terms as used in the Code. Again, under the Constitution, judges are independent and are subject to no authority other than that of the law (article 97), so that we cannot anticipate events and interpret the provisions of the law until they have been interpreted through the judgements handed down by the judiciary.

With regard to the penalties provided for a violation of article 15 of the Act on Nuclear Energy and Radiation (No. 29 of 2001), article 23 of this Act lays down the penalties for violation of its provisions, as follows:

"Any person who contravenes the provisions of articles 15 and 18 of this Act shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than three years or a fine of not less than 10,000 dinars and not more than 30,000 dinars, or both these penalties."

It should be mentioned that Jordan is a party to most of the international agreements that advocate a policy of non-use of nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes, the most important being the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It submits its installation to ongoing monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through the periodic visits carried out by the Agency and Jordan's periodic reports submitted to and authenticated by the Agency. The Act on Nuclear Energy and Radiation Protection (No. 29 of 2001) was prepared in accordance with IAEA standards and on the basis of the technical guidance provided by it.

The Committee asks about the competence of Jordanian courts to deal with criminal acts of terrorism of the following kinds:

(a) An act of terrorism committed by a person who is a citizen of, or habitually resident in, Jordan (whether that person is currently present in Jordan or not);

(b) A terrorist act committed outside Jordan by a foreign national who is currently in Jordan.

The Jordanian courts are competent to deal with criminal acts carried out by any Jordanian, on the basis of the principle of personal jurisdiction laid down in article 10 of the Jordanian Penal Code, so long as such person has not been convicted outside Jordan for the same crime and the sentence has been served, lapsed because of the statute of limitations or been the subject of a pardon.

Jordanian courts also have competence to deal with criminal acts committed outside Jordan by a foreign national who is currently present in Jordanian territory, so long as no request for extradition from his own country has been granted under international agreements and the laws governing the principles of extradition of offenders.

• **Paragraph 2 (f) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

With regard to the Committee's question on the time frame for response to a request for judicial assistance in criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, this is governed by the agreements between Jordan and other States on the exchange of judicial assistance. There is no legally specified time within which measures must be taken. This depends on the time required by the measure requested, which is actually carried out with all possible expedition. It is also appropriate to mention that article 147 of the Penal Code gives the Attorney-General broad powers to coordinate and cooperate with all concerned national and international authorities where it is proven that the case under consideration is connected to terrorist activities.

With regard to clarification of the term "judicial legislation" on page 8 of Jordan's report and its relevance for the implementation of paragraph 2 (f) of the resolution, this term means legislation relating to the competence of Jordanian courts to consider requests submitted by other States for the extradition of offenders. It comes within the context of international cooperation in criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 (f) of resolution 1373 (2001).

• **Paragraph 2 (g) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

In reply to the Committee's question about legal provisions (other than those relating to the forgery of entry visas and official travel documents) which exclude from access to Jordan alleged terrorists who are not asylum-seekers, it may be said that aliens are permitted to enter the Kingdom provided that the individual in question holds a valid passport or travel document issued by his country and recognized by the Jordanian Government and has obtained a visa for entry into the Kingdom. In order for an alien to obtain such a visa, he must submit an application supplying all the requested information and data, which is verified prior to issuance of a visa.

In addition to the above, if an alien enters Jordanian territory in a regular manner, the Minister of the Interior may deport him from the country on the basis of

a recommendation by the Director of Public Security, in which case he may not return save with special permission from the Minister on the basis of the provisions of articles 4 and 37 of the Act on the Residence and Affairs of Aliens.

Lastly, infiltration from or to Jordanian territory is deemed an offence under the provisions of article 149 of the Penal Code, and the perpetrator is liable to arrest and, if carrying a weapon or any explosive material, to a term of imprisonment.

• **Paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

Since the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001), the Government has intensified measures to promote and accelerate cooperation and the exchange of information with other States, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorists, traffic in arms, explosives or prohibited and sensitive materials. It must be mentioned that the General Intelligence Department tracks elements that may constitute a danger to the country's security and persons connected with terrorist groups or the illegal arms trade. There is coordination and exchange of information with other States, and this cooperation is expected to enhance security on a basis of reciprocity. There is also a bureau in the General Security Directorate called the "Arab and International Police Bureau", headed by an officer holding the rank of colonel, that deals with the exchange of information and the ensuring of rapid communications with the security organs of other States and Interpol for the purpose of tracking wanted or suspected persons and exchanging all information relating to them.

The security organs in Jordan also exchange expertise in the field of counter-terrorism with their counterparts in other States through specialized training programmes which provide training in the latest tools and techniques in this area.

• **Paragraph 3 (d)**

With regard to the steps taken by Jordan in order to become a party to international instruments on counter-terrorism, in confirmation of what was stated in Jordan's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Jordanian Government has set up a specialized committee, composed of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and the Central Bank, to study all aspects of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, with a view to Jordan's becoming a party to it and to review Jordanian legislation in this context in order to ensure that it is consistent with the provisions of the Convention.

The Committee came up with positive conclusions and recommendations in favour of accession to the Convention, which were referred to the Council of Ministers, which adopted the appropriate decision for their approval. The Council of Ministers is expected to approve the Convention in the near future, in preparation for completion of the constitutional procedures and the Convention's entry into effect.

The Government is also giving positive consideration, in accordance with paragraph 3 (d) of resolution 1373 (2001), to the possibility of acceding in the immediate future to the following international conventions on the combating of terrorism, and they have been referred to the competent authorities:

1. The International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, which Jordan has already signed, with the aim of studying all aspects of the Convention and Jordanian

legislation with a view to Jordan's accession to it in the near future. The same steps have been taken with regard to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf;

2. A study has been made of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; it is expected that recommendations for Jordan's accession to the Convention will be made to the Council of Ministers in the near future;

3. The competent authorities in Jordan are studying the provisions of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material with a view to Jordan's accession to it in the near future.

• **Paragraph 3 (f) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

With regard to the question of how Jordan ascertains that a person seeking asylum is not a terrorist, article 21 of the Jordanian Constitution provides as follows:

"Political refugees shall not be extradited on account of their political beliefs or for their defence of liberty."

Article 45, paragraph 1, of the Constitution provides as follows:

"The Council of Ministers shall be entrusted with the responsibility of administering all affairs of the State, internal and external, with the exception of such matters as are or may be entrusted by the present Constitution or by any other legislation to any other person or body."

The provision of article 21 is a general one that is incorporated in most legislation in the various countries of the world, because it provides for the protection of human rights and affirms the right of each human being to defend his principles and beliefs as a sacrosanct right that must be protected.

The Council of Ministers, under its general mandate, is the authority entrusted with consideration of any application for political asylum submitted by an alien, and before issuing a decision on the matter, it makes a thoroughgoing study and detailed check of all data pertaining to the applicant and conducts investigations by all security channels to ascertain his character and record. Issuance of the decision also takes into account the interests of the Jordanian State, ensuring that its security is not exposed to the slightest degree of danger and that the granting of asylum in no way jeopardizes the Jordanian State at the bilateral or international level, so that consequently it is out of the question for the Government to approve a request for political asylum from any person who is suspected of any terrorist acts or of committing any crime or who is a fugitive from justice in any State.

• **Paragraph 3 (g) of resolution 1373 (2001)**

In reply to the Committee's question regarding paragraph 3 (g) and failure of States to ensure "that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists" in the light of the provisions of article 21 of the Jordanian Constitution, while the instance cited in the Counter-Terrorism Committee's question is hypothetical, the competent decision-making entity, namely the Council of Ministers, may decide to rescind its decision to grant political asylum to a person who has been granted it if he commits any acts

that affect the sovereignty or higher interests of Jordan or endanger its security and it is proven that such person has not respected and has contravened the bases and conditions of the granting of asylum, including by the commission of terrorist acts, or that he committed such acts in the past and the Council of Ministers was unable to be aware of or take cognizance of them at the time. In such a case, international agreements and Jordanian legislation lay down the principles for the extradition of ordinary criminals in accordance with the provisions of article 21, paragraph 2, of the Constitution.

With regard to the Committee's question about progress made in enacting legislation, and making other necessary arrangements, to implement the instruments to which Jordan has become a party (para. 3 (d) of the resolution), there is nothing in the international agreements on counter-terrorism to which Jordan has become a party that conflicts with the provisions of the Jordanian Constitution and legislation in force. On the contrary, the terrorist acts targeted in the pertinent international agreements to which Jordan has become a party have already been criminalized through the enactment of appropriate penal provisions in Jordanian legislation and the imposition of deterrent penalties for such crimes proportionate to the act in question. The financial and banking legislation and the regulations and directives issued thereunder are in conformity with the provisions set forth in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, taking into account the draft act on money-laundering referred to above.

With regard to the question whether the offences set forth in the relevant international conventions and protocols on counter-terrorism have been included as extraditable offences in the bilateral treaties to which Jordan is a party (para. 3 (e) of the resolution), those offences have not been included specifically in these bilateral treaties except to the extent that such offences are criminalized in the legal systems of both countries and consequently require extradition inasmuch as they are commonly criminalized by the legal regimes of countries.

• **Other matters**

Jordan will submit an organizational chart of its administrative machinery in its next report to the Committee, as an updated version of the chart is under preparation.



Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 2 January 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council


I refer to my letter of 12 August 2002 (S/2002/918) transmitting a report from Suriname submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has considered the report carefully with the assistance of its experts and has written to the Permanent Representative of Suriname to the United Nations to set out its preliminary comments. Suriname has been requested to provide a response in the form of a supplementary report by 15 March 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**

Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 2 January 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letter of 23 August 2002 (S/2002/962) transmitting a report from Solomon Islands submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).


The Counter-Terrorism Committee has considered the report carefully with the assistance of its experts and has written to the Permanent Representative of Solomon Islands to the United Nations to set out its preliminary comments. Solomon Islands has been requested to provide a response in the form of a supplementary report by 25 February 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**

Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism





Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 2 January 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letters of 20 June and 12 August 2002 (S/2002/693 and Add.1) transmitting a supplementary report from Belarus submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has considered the report carefully with the assistance of its experts and has written to the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations to set out its preliminary comments. Belarus has been requested to provide a response in the form of a supplementary report by 15 March 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**

Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism





Security Council

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8 January 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 2 January 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council


I refer to my letter of 18 July 2002 (S/2002/796) transmitting a supplementary report from Brazil submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has considered the report carefully with the assistance of its experts and has written to the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations to set out its preliminary comments. Brazil has been requested to provide a response in the form of a supplementary report by 15 March 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**

Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism





Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 2 January 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letter of 31 July 2002 (S/2002/864) transmitting a supplementary report from Costa Rica submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has considered the report carefully with the assistance of its experts and has written to the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations to set out its preliminary comments. Costa Rica has been requested to provide a response in the form of a supplementary report by 25 February 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**

Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism





Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 2 January 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letter of 2 July 2002 (S/2002/729) transmitting a supplementary report from El Salvador submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has considered the report carefully with the assistance of its experts and has written to the Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations to set out its preliminary comments. El Salvador has been requested to provide a response in the form of a supplementary report by 25 February 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jeremy **Greenstock**

Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 2 January 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letter of 31 July 2002 (S/2002/879) transmitting a supplementary report from Finland submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has considered the report carefully with the assistance of its experts and has written to the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations to set out its preliminary comments. Finland has been requested to provide a response in the form of a supplementary report by 25 February 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**
Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 2 January 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letter of 28 May 2002 (S/2002/599) transmitting a supplementary report from Grenada submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has considered the report carefully with the assistance of its experts and has written to the Permanent Representative of Grenada to the United Nations to set out its preliminary comments. Grenada has been requested to provide a response in the form of a supplementary report by 15 March 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**

Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism





Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 2 January 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letter of 18 July 2002 (S/2002/784) transmitting a supplementary report from Guatemala submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has considered the report carefully with the assistance of its experts and has written to the Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations to set out its preliminary comments. Guatemala has been requested to provide a response in the form of a supplementary report by 15 March 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**
Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism





Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 2 January 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letter of 18 July 2002 (S/2002/797) transmitting a supplementary report from Pakistan submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has considered the report carefully with the assistance of its experts and has written to the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations to set out its preliminary comments. Pakistan has been requested to provide a response in the form of a supplementary report by 25 February 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jeremy **Greenstock**
Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism





Security Council

Distr.: General
9 January 2003
English
Original: French

Letter dated 6 January 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

Major-General Miguel Angel Moreno of Argentina relinquished his post as Force Commander of UNIKOM on 18 November 2002. After consultation with the parties concerned, I propose to appoint Brigadier-General Franciszek Gagor of Poland to succeed him as Force Commander of UNIKOM.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General





Security Council

Distr.: General
9 January 2003
English
Original: French

Letter dated 9 January 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 6 January 2003 (S/2003/27) concerning your proposal to appoint Brigadier-General Franciszek Gągor of Poland as the next Force Commander of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council, who take note of the proposal.

(Signed) Jean-Marc de La Sablière
President of the Security Council





Security Council

Distr.: General
10 January 2003
English
Original: French

Letter dated 9 January 2003 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 6 January 2003 (S/2003/27) concerning your proposal to appoint Brigadier-General Franciszek Gągor of Poland as the next Force Commander of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council, who take note of the proposal.

(Signed) Jean-Marc de **La Sablière**
President of the Security Council

* Reissued for technical reasons.



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
9 January 2003
English
Original: French

**Letter dated 8 January 2003 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to refer to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 18 December 2002 (S/PRST/2002/40) concerning the situation in Burundi and to the Ceasefire Agreement which was signed by the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) in Arusha on 2 December 2002.

I am pleased to inform the members of the Security Council that the Secretariat stands ready in principle to provide the necessary expertise and advice for the planned African mission provided for in the Ceasefire Agreement.

As it is essential to maintain the momentum generated by the Agreement, the Secretariat has already developed the proposed terms of reference for the chairman of the Joint Ceasefire Commission and is approaching Member States to ascertain their interest in nominating suitable candidates to fill such a position. A preliminary planning exercise has also begun with a view to assisting, if required, with the development of a plan of operations for the proposed African mission.

At the same time, the Secretariat urgently awaits additional information from the parties, the Facilitator of the Burundi peace process and/or the Regional Initiative in order to proceed with the provision of additional assistance. The information needed includes inter alia:

- Relationship of the Joint Ceasefire Commission to the African mission;
- Definition of the objectives and mandate of the African mission;
- Urgent identification of a lead nation for the proposed African mission;
- Identification of focal points within all Burundian parties involved to provide the necessary information, including the number and location of troops combatants, weapons, supply requirements, number of dependants, logistical and communication equipment and transportation needs;
- Identification of special needs and gaps in logistical support among potential troop-contributing countries;
- Agreement as soon as possible, with expert assistance, on key modalities of cantonment of the armed Burundian elements (including location, size,



transportation of combatants, availability of locally produced food, availability of water and accessibility).

It should be noted that the Secretariat awaits a formal request from the parties regarding the provision of a senior military officer to chair the Joint Ceasefire Commission. My Special Representative for Burundi is expected to take up these and other crucial issues with his regional interlocutors.

The coming weeks will be critical for the peace process in Burundi. I look forward to working closely with members of the Security Council, as well as the wider donor community, to increase the efforts of the United Nations to assist the Burundian parties and the regional leaders in realizing a lasting peace in Burundi, which has remained elusive for so long.

(Signed) Kofi A. **Annan**



Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

1. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 and after consultations among the members of the Council, it was agreed to elect the following Vice-Chairmen of the Committee established by resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism:

Ismael Abraão Gaspar Martins (Angola)

Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (Mexico)

Sergey Lavrov (Russian Federation)

These appointments are effective immediately.

2. Sir Jeremy Greenstock will continue as Chairman of the Committee. Members of the Council also elected Inocencio Arias (Spain) as the next Chairman of the Committee, to assume that position following the review of the structure and activities of the Committee, which is to take place no later than 4 April 2003.





Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2003

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) — Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

1. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 and after consultations among the members of the Council, it was agreed to elect the following Vice-Chairmen of the Committee established by resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism:

Ismael Abraão Gaspar Martins (Angola)

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These appointments are effective immediately.

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* Reissued for technical reasons.





Security Council

Distr. General
10 January 2003
English
Original Arabic

**Identical letters dated 4 January 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the
Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities of the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 4 January 2003.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed S. Ali
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the identical letters dated 4 January 2003 from the
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the
President of the Security Council**

**Report on the activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection
teams in Iraq**

Inspection activities on Saturday, 4 January 2003

I. IAEA inspection team

A first group, consisting of four inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. and arrived at 9.25 a.m. at the Al-Ma'mun plant of the Al-Rashid public company, part of the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC), situated 60 kilometres south of Baghdad. The group met the specialists of the plant and inquired about its activities and specialized scientific areas. The group then inspected all the plant's facilities. The group completed its mission at 1.10 p.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 1.50 p.m.

A second group, consisting of five inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.35 a.m. and arrived at 9.35 a.m. at the Al-Abur public company, an MIC company, in Khan Dhari, 30 kilometres west of Baghdad. The group inquired about the company and its links, as well as any changes that had taken place in the company. It also requested information on the aluminium pipes used by the Dhu-Al-Fiqar plant from 1998 to 2002. The group then inspected the site where the aluminium pipes were stored and performed radiation checks, using portable equipment, on all the company's facilities and roads, including around the buildings, with a view to detecting the radioactivity said to be present. The group received two pipes, one machine-made, the other not. The group completed its mission at 12.30 p.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 1.15 p.m.

II. UNMOVIC chemical inspection team

The team, consisting of 14 inspectors, left the Canal Hotel at 9.05 a.m. and arrived at 10 a.m. at the Ibn Sina public company of the Military Industrialization Corporation, 35 kilometres north of Baghdad. The company, which has already been visited many times by inspection teams, was mentioned in the report of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Tony Blair, as being one of the sites suspected of conducting prohibited activities. The team met the company director and asked him about the company's specialists, their qualifications and specializations, and the various places where they had worked while under contract, as well as the universities where they had studied. The team then inspected the small production units located within the company, as well as the laboratories. It also inspected the site's computers. The team completed its mission at 2.45 p.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 3.50 p.m.

III. UNMOVIC joint biological, chemical and missile inspection team

The team, consisting of eight inspectors, left the Canal Hotel, Baghdad, at 9:05 a.m. and arrived at the Suwayra airbase in the Wasit governorate at 10:30 a.m. The team met the base commander and inquired about the base's links, construction history and changes that had taken place in its layout since 1998. The team then inspected the base's hangars and facilities. It completed its mission at 1:45 p.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 2:45 p.m.

IV. UNMOVIC biological inspection team

A first group, consisting of 13 inspectors, left the Canal Hotel, Baghdad, at 8:35 a.m. and arrived at the Al-Khalis alcohol factory in the Khalis district, Diyala governorate, at 9:25 a.m. The group inquired about the plant's activities and production, its production capacity, organizational chart, changes since 1998, names of the plant's senior personnel and the type of fermentation agent used in production. The group then inspected all the plant's facilities, asked questions about its activities during the inspection and inspected equipment that had been tagged and placed under the monitoring regime. The group completed its mission at 11:45 a.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 12:30 p.m.

A second group, consisting of 13 inspectors, having spent the night in Basra governorate, left the hotel in Basra at 8:30 a.m. and arrived at the Basra University Agricultural Faculty at 8:55 a.m. The group met with the Faculty's Dean and inquired about the Faculty's departments, teaching staff and the main research conducted since 1998. The group then inspected the Faculty's departments and its food industries plant. They also inspected tagged equipment and the declarations submitted. The group completed its mission at 11 a.m. and then proceeded to another site, arriving at the Training Faculty of Basra University at 11 a.m. It met with the Dean of the Faculty, asked about the staff of the Biology Department and requested the list of names of heads of department and principal researchers in the Biology Department. The group then inspected the Faculty's departments and tagged equipment, as well as the declarations provided. The group completed its mission at 12:05 p.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 12:35 p.m.

V. Today, a group of 21 inspectors visited Mosul to establish a field office in Mosul governorate for the purpose of conducting inspection activities in that governorate.

VI. Remarks

The different inspection teams visited a total of seven sites various parts of Iraq, including two sites in Basra governorate. A total of 75 inspectors took part in these inspections.



Security Council

Distr.: General
10 January 2003
English
Original: Arabic

**Identical letters dated 5 January 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the
Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report for 5 January 2003 on the activities of the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed S. Ali
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the identical letters dated 5 January 2003 from the
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the
President of the Security Council**

**Report on the activities of the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspection
teams in Iraq on 5 January 2003**

I. IAEA inspection team

A group consisting of seven inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0835 hours and travelled to the site of the Saddam State Enterprise, a complex located in the area of Amiriyah Fallujah, 70 kilometres west of Baghdad. This enterprise is an affiliate of the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC). Having been placed under the ongoing monitoring regime, it had already been visited by IAEA inspectors on 11 December 2002. On their arrival at the site at 1020 hours, the inspectors met with the Director of the company and asked him for explanations concerning the activities of his establishment and the factories attached to it. The team concentrated its work on the graphite electrode factory, asking questions as to why the enterprise had been set up, the number of persons working there and the changes which had taken place since 1998. The inspectors searched the factory, inspecting all buildings, workshops and warehouses and noting the activities taking place within them. They also examined samples of carbon to be used for the production of graphite electrodes and photographed all the factory buildings and equipment located therein. They also measured radiation levels, using portable equipment, on all roads serving the enterprise and the graphite electrode factory. The team completed its task at 1250 hours and arrived back at the Canal Hotel at 1425 hours.

II. UNMOVIC missile inspection team

1. First group

A group consisting of 18 inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 0830 hours. At 0925 hours it arrived at the site of the State Enterprise 7 Nisan, an MIC affiliate, which produces artillery rockets. On arrival at the enterprise at 0915 hours, the inspectors met with the general manager and requested clarifications concerning the activities of his establishment. They then verified declarations and examined the products produced by the company, inspecting all buildings. The group completed its assignment at 1325 hours and arrived back at the Canal Hotel at 1645 hours.

2. Second group

A second group consisting of four inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 0840 hours, travelling to the site of the Ma'mun factory, an MIC affiliate located 60 kilometres south of Baghdad. Upon their arrival at 0930 hours, the inspectors went to the propellant recipients located in the factory and tagged 15 of them. They then went to the company's administrative offices and inspected the plans of the offices and the company's organizational chart, then carefully inspected certain equipment which had been tagged. The group completed its assignment at 1200 hours and arrived back at the Canal Hotel at 1315 hours.

III. UNMOVIC multidisciplinary (chemical, biological and missile) inspection team

1. First group

A group consisting of 10 inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 0830 hours and travelled to the Aziziyah firing range, located in the Aziziyah region (Wasit governorate). Upon arrival at 1040 hours, the inspectors requested explanations as to what authorities the site came under, its activities, the number of persons working there and the activities which had taken place there since 1998. They also took samples of three demolition bombs and measured radiation levels in the area, moving around on foot or in vehicles. The group completed its assignment at 1335 hours and returned to the Canal Hotel at 1500 hours.

2. Second group

A second group, consisting of 13 inspectors, left the UNMOVIC office in Mosul at 0900 hours and travelled to the Ibn Sina state hospital also located in Mosul. Upon their arrival at 0930 hours, the inspectors toured the hospital, visiting the laboratories, canteen, buildings and facilities, and met with the Director, requesting him to provide clarifications concerning the number of doctors, their scientific diplomas and the services provided by the establishment. The group completed its assignment at 1120 hours and returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 1130 hours.

IV. UNMOVIC biological inspection team

1. Group I

A team of 13 inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0835 hours. The inspectors arrived at the Rashid Military Hospital, also located in Baghdad, at 0910 hours and requested information on the various parts of the laboratory, its activities, the specialists working there, the changes that had taken place in it and the type of samples analysed there. The team also inspected the entire site, studied the declarations in detail and carefully examined and then photographed the tagged equipment. It then went to the army's central medical laboratory, located near the Rashid military hospital, where it met the Director of the laboratory and questioned him about the laboratory's activities, the substances produced there, the reagents used and the changes that had taken place there since 1998. The inspectors also inspected the entire site before examining in detail and photographing the tagged equipment. They completed their work at 1345 hours and returned to the Canal Hotel at 1405 hours.

2. Group II

The team of 13 inspectors, which had just spent its second night in Basra, left the hotel at 0835 hours for the Faculty of Sciences, the Faculty of Medicine and the Centre for Oceanographic Studies of Basra University. They arrived at 0850 hours and proceeded to ask the specialists working in those establishments to provide information on their activities. They then carefully examined the equipment and supplies and inspected the various departments. The team completed its work at 1240 hours and returned to the Canal Hotel at 1300 hours.

V. UNMOVIC chemical inspection team

The team of 20 inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 0855 hours and arrived at the Jadiriya complex, located in the Jadiriya area of Baghdad, at 0925 hours. The inspectors went to the Bassil State Enterprise, an MIC affiliate specializing in research on petrochemicals, anti-corrosion products and ingredients for pharmaceutical products. The team met with the Director and asked him about the company's primary activities, the number of scientists on its staff and the type of research which it conducted. The team also inspected the laboratories and other buildings in the complex and asked the specialists working in the laboratories to provide information on their activities. It prohibited all movement throughout the complex, blocking the entrances and exits, including those of the following companies and sites:

1. Al-Khawarizmi State Enterprise, an MIC affiliate specializing in software;
2. Batani State Enterprise, an MIC affiliate specializing in the study of space and atmospheric layers;
3. Majd State Enterprise, an MIC affiliate specializing in engineering studies;
4. A Ministry of Commerce food analysis laboratory; and
5. A construction and glass research centre of the Ministry of Industry and Mining.

The team completed its work and returned to the Canal Hotel at 1530 hours.

VI. Remarks

There were an unusually large number of inspections that day, with 98 inspectors inspecting a total of 16 sites.



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**Identical letters dated 6 January 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the
Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities of the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 6 January 2003.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed **Salman**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the identical letters dated 6 January 2003 from the
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the
President of the Security Council**

**Report on the activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection
teams in Iraq**

Inspection activities on Monday, 6 January 2003

1. IAEA inspection team

A team of seven inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. and arrived at the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission site at Tuwaythah at 8.55 a.m. Upon arriving, the team inspected the facilities housing the neutron generator, the trade department, physics department, laser research laboratories and the storage facility for liquid nitrogen. The main gates of the facilities were opened and the team made sure that no activity was being carried out that day, 6 January 2003, an official holiday in Iraq to commemorate the eighty-second anniversary of the establishment of the Iraqi army. The team photographed the main gates when closed and performed radiation surveys, using portable equipment, with a view to detecting any radioactivity in the roads surrounding the nuclear material storage plant. The team completed its mission at 10.45 a.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 11 a.m.

2. UNMOVIC inspection team (biological)

(a) One group, consisting of nine inspectors, left Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. At 9 a.m. it arrived at the Centre for Veterinary Drugs Research and Production belonging to the Ministry of Industry and Mining, 10 kilometres north of Baghdad. The group inquired about the Centre's organizational chart, senior officials, current activities, number of owners, number of employees with qualifications in higher education and the links between the Centre and other bodies. The group inspected the research and production facility and asked about its activities and the types of research being conducted. It examined tagged equipment with meticulous care, took samples from a culture containing bacteria and from a mixing container, and inspected a chemical storage plant. The group completed its mission at 11.15 a.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 11.35 a.m.

(b) A second group, consisting of 13 inspectors, left the Hotel at Basrah at 8.30 a.m., returning to Baghdad after having spent two days in Basrah inspecting six sites.

3. UNMOVIC joint inspection team (chemical, missiles, biological)

The team of eight inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 9 a.m. At 10 a.m. they arrived at the Specialized Maintenance Department of the Faw public company in the Sab' Abkar quarter of Baghdad. The team met the Assistant Director for maintenance and asked him about the Department's activities and clients. It then proceeded to inspect all facilities on the site. The team completed its mission at 11.45 a.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 12.10 p.m.

4. UNMOVIC joint inspection team at Mosul

The team of 15 inspectors left the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 9 a.m. At 9.40 a.m. it reached the Nineveh free trade zone, which falls under the Free Trading Zone Commission, 20 kilometres north of Mosul. The team met the zone's director and questioned him on the trade activities and merchandise connected with the free trade zone. They then inspected all the facilities on the site, including the computer. The team completed its mission at 12.55 p.m. and returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel in Mosul.

5. UNMOVIC inspection team (missiles)

The team of eight inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 10.20 a.m. At 11 a.m. they arrived at the Al-Fateh missile display site in the Yussifiyah zone, 30 kilometres south of Baghdad, where they tagged the missiles. The team completed its mission at 12.30 p.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 1.10 p.m.

6. UNMOVIC inspection team (chemical)

The team of 13 inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8.25 a.m. At 9.45 a.m. it arrived at the pesticide plant in the Saqlawiyah area, in Anbar governorate. This site, which belongs to the Tariq State Enterprise, a subsidiary of the Military Industrialization Corporation, had already been visited several times by inspection teams, most recently on 19 December 2002. The site, which had been subjected to monitoring, was bombed during the attack by the United States of America in December 1998. According to a report prepared by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Tony Blair, in September 2002, the site was being used to produce chemical weapons. The team met the director of the plant and various specialists, and inquired about the plant's activities and clients. The team also took samples from a storage facility and from all the production units in the plant. The team completed its mission at 5.05 p.m. and returned to the Canal Hotel at 6.25 p.m.

7. Remarks

The inspection teams visited six sites today. The 60 inspectors participating in the inspection activities took samples and performed radiation surveys in some of the sites visited.



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Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report for 7 January 2003 on the activities of the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed S. Ali
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the identical letters dated 7 January 2003 from the
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the
President of the Security Council**

Activities of the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspection teams in Iraq

Report on inspection activities for Tuesday, 7 January 2003

I. IAEA inspection team

I. One group, consisting of four inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0840 hours, and at 0955 hours it arrived at the Bakr airbase. The group verified a quantity of HMX explosive supplies to the base by the Qa'qa' State Enterprise. The group inspected the site where the explosive was used, namely a building containing fortified shelters that had been damaged in the course of the United States and British aggression in December 1998 and removed by blasting. The group photographed the area and also visited the storage hangar where the HMX was kept and made a radiometric survey of the road surrounding the base, using hand-held devices. The group completed its assignment at 1215 hours and returned to the Canal Hotel at 1325 hours.

A second group, consisting of three inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0830 hours, and at 1000 hours it arrived at the Kubaysah cement plant belonging to the Ministry of Industry and Mining in Anbar governorate. Upon arrival, the group interviewed the manager of the plant and asked him about its activity and the strength of its engineering staff and also about the amount of HMX supplied to the plant by the Qa'qa' State Enterprise and the reason it was used for purposes of blasting. The group then proceeded to the quarry, where the HMX was used and took samples from the quarry. The group inspected the storage hangar where the HMX was formerly kept, which was located among the Hit ammunition stores. The group made surveys of the storage hangar and photographed it from inside. The group completed its assignment at 1625 hours and returned to the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 1850 hours.

II. UNMOVIC biological inspection team

A team of eight inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0835 hours, and at 0925 hours it arrived at the Saddam Centre for Cancer and Medical Genetics in the Qadisiyah areas of Baghdad. The team interviewed the director of the Centre and asked him about its departments, the main changes that had occurred from 1998 up to the present, the names on its basic manning table, a description of current activities and a list of current research. The team then made a tour of all the Centre's departments, in the course of which they asked about the activity of its scientific departments. The team completed its assignment at 1115 hours and returned to the Canal Hotel at 1150 hours.

III. UNMOVIC multidisciplinary team in Mosul

A team of nine inspectors left the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 0900 hours, and at 0905 hours it arrived at Mosul University, where the team divided into two groups.

1. One group inspected the chemistry department of the Faculty of Sciences and interviewed the head of the department. It requested from him a list of the names and specializations of the teaching staff and asked about the projects they supervised, research currently under way, whether there was a relationship between the department and the Military Industrialization Corporation, what was the connection between the Faculty and other Iraqi and international faculties and to what extent the Internet was used.

2. A second group visited the Faculty of Education and interviewed the Dean and his scientific assistant and asked them about the Faculty's professors and their specializations, the Faculty's departments, the identity of the heads of department, what new supplies the Faculty had, the changes that had occurred during the past four years and the Faculty's relationship to other agencies. The group inspected the laboratories of the chemistry, biology and physics departments and checked the tagged equipment. The group completed its assignment at 1250 hours and returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 1255 hours.

IV. UNMOVIC missile inspection team

1. One group, consisting of eight inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0835 hours and proceeded to the Sumud plant, which belongs to the Karamah State Enterprise, a subsidiary of the Military Industrial Corporation, and which is located in the Abu Ghraib area, 15 kilometres west of Baghdad. The inspection teams had already visited this site a number of times, most recently on 30 December 2002. The group interviewed the plant's manager and asked him about some of the tests to be conducted on the two Sumud missile engines and some other technical questions. The group then examined and photographed the engine readied for testing. The group completed its assignment at 1045 hours and proceeded to the Rifah site belonging to the same company and located at Amiriyah/Fallujah, arriving at 1155 hours. The group examined and photographed the engine attached to the test stand. The group completed its assignment at 1225 hours and returned to the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 1410 hours.

2. A second group, consisting of four inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0850 hours, and at 1000 hours it arrived at the missile review area in Fallujah. The group tagged the missiles. It completed its assignment at 1220 hours and returned to the Canal Hotel at 1330 hours.

3. A third group, consisting of 11 inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0830 hours, and at 0930 hours it arrived at the Mu'tasim plant, which belongs to the Rashid State Enterprise, a subsidiary of the Military Industrialization Corporation, and which is located 75 kilometres south of Baghdad. The group inspected some of the plant's buildings and tagged two mixers and the casting tank. The group completed its assignment at 1115 hours and returned to the Canal Hotel at Baghdad at 1230 hours.

V. UNMOVIC chemical inspection team

An UNMOVIC inspection team, consisting of 14 inspectors, made the first helicopter-borne inspection. Three Bell-212 helicopters, accompanied by Iraqi helicopters, left the Rashid airfield in Baghdad at 0703 hours and at 0935 hours arrived at the Qa'im State Enterprise for Phosphates, which is located 400 kilometres west of Baghdad. Upon arrival at the above-mentioned site, the team

interviewed the assistant general manager of the company and asked him about its products and the most important changes that had occurred from 1998 up to the present. The team then made a general tour of all the company's facilities and took samples of its industrial waste area. The team completed its assignment at 1520 hours and arrived at the Rashid airfield at 1740 hours.

VI. UNMOVIC multidisciplinary inspection team

A team of 10 inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0730 hours, and at 1000 hours it arrived at the Ukhaydir ammunition stores located 70 kilometres south of Karbala⁷. The team asked workers at the stores about activity there. The team then inspected all the ammunition stores and examined the types of ammunition stored. The team completed its assignment at 1715 hours and returned to the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 2020 hours.

VII. Remarks

The number of sites inspected on this day totalled 11, with 71 inspectors taking part.



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Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report for 8 January 2003 on the activities of the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed S. Ali
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the identical letters dated 8 January 2003 from the
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the
President of the Security Council**

**Report on the activities of the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspection
teams in Iraq**

Inspection activities on 8 January 2003

I. IAEA inspection team

Today the IAEA inspection team divided into three groups, as follows:

1. A group consisting of two inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0735 hours, and at 1100 hours it arrived at the Samawah Cement Plant in Muthanna governorate.
2. A second group left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0800 hours, and at 1008 hours it arrived at the Kufah Cement Plant in Najaf governorate.
3. A third group, consisting of three inspectors, left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 1020 hours and proceeded to the Karbala Cement Plant in Najaf governorate.

The purpose of visiting the above-mentioned cement plants was to check amounts of HMX used in blasting stone quarries in the cement industry.

**II. UNMOVIC multidisciplinary (chemical, missile and biological)
inspection team**

A team of eight inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0900 hours, and at 0930 hours it arrived at the machinery and mechanics division of the Nasr State Enterprise, which comes under the Ministry of Irrigation and is located in the Sayyidiyah area of Baghdad. The team interviewed the head of the division and asked him about the machinery under repair, the sources of spare parts, the size of the division's manning table and whether there was cooperation with the armed forces. The team then inspected all the site's facilities. The team completed its assignment at 1200 hours and arrived back at the Canal Hotel at 1220 hours.

**III. UNMOVIC multidisciplinary (chemical, missile and biological)
inspection team in Mosul**

A team of 11 inspectors left its headquarters at Nineveh Palace Hotel at 0900 hours, and at 0915 hours it arrived at the Ninawa State Enterprise for the Manufacture of Drugs and Medicines belonging to the Ministry of Industry and Mining and located 15 kilometres north of Mosul. Upon arrival, the team held a meeting with the general manager of the company and asked him about the machinery and outlets for the marketing of drugs. The team then inspected the marketing records and the computers. The team completed its assignment at 1015 hours. It then proceeded to another site and arrived at 1045 hours at the Genetic Analysis Plant belonging to the same company and located in the Karakah district of

Mosul. The team interviewed the manager of the plant and asked him how many workers the plant had, how many of them held advanced degrees, what types of tests were carried out on the products and the types of products. The team then inspected all the plant's facilities. It completed its assignment at 1150 hours and arrived back at the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 1205 hours.

IV. UNMOVIC biological team

A team of 12 inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0835 hours, and at 0905 hours it arrived at the Faculty of Medicine of Saddam University located in the Kazimiyah district of Baghdad. The team interviewed the Faculty's representative for liaison with the National Monitoring Directorate and asked about the Faculty, the degree awarded by it, the number of student admissions, the criteria for admission and the authority that determined whether students were admitted for advanced studies. The team then interviewed the head of the Faculty's department of microbiology and asked him about the research under way in the department and research on the study of the resistance of micro-organisms to antibiotics. The team inspected all the Faculty's departments, as well as the stores and electrical transformers. It also checked all tagged supplies. The team completed its assignment at 1330 hours and arrived back at the Canal Hotel at 1400 hours.

V. UNMOVIC chemical inspection team

A team of nine inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 0835 hours, and at 0945 hours it arrived at the chlorine plant of the Tariq State Enterprise, belonging to MIC and located in the Saqlawiyah area in Anbar governorate, 90 kilometres north-west of Baghdad. The name of this chlorine site is mentioned in the report by Mr. Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister as producing chemical weapons. The inspection teams have already visited this site. The team interviewed the director of the plant and asked him about some of the equipment there. It then inspected the stores of raw materials and the stores of equipment and apparatus. It took two samples of the soil from one of the stores. The team completed its assignment at 1313 hours and arrived back at the Canal Hotel at 1435 hours.

VI. UNMOVIC missile inspection team

A team of nine inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0840 hours, and at 0940 hours it arrived at the Ma'mun plant belonging to the Rashid State Enterprise, an MIC subsidiary located 60 kilometres south of Baghdad. The team tagged Fath missile engines and observed the process of solid fuel casting for Fath missiles. The team completed its assignment at 1200 hours and arrived back at the Canal Hotel at 1300 hours.

VII. Remarks

The number of sites inspected by the various inspection teams on this day totalled eight, with 56 inspectors taking part.